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Behavioural economics draws upon fieldwork, experiments and research in disciplines 
such as psychology for building blocks to construct economic analysis that is more 
descriptively realistic and both augments and qualifies traditional economics as a tool for 
designing policy. Though behavioural economics has attracted much attention and 
respectability in the past decade or so, its roots date back to work undertaken in Europe a 
century ago and in the US in the middle of the twentieth century. Whereas economists 
traditionally have seen choice as an optimising activity subject to given preferences and a 
well-defined budget constraint, behavioural economics sees everyday life as a process in 
which humans with limited cognitive capacity try to cope with both information overload 
and the absence of relevant information and knowledge by evolving targets for what 
seems feasible and systems of rules for trying to find ways of meeting these targets.  
Some decision rules may be fast and frugal means of arriving at choices that do 
not result in needlessly poor attainments. However, much of what is known about how 
people actually behave implies that many people could be doing a lot better for 
themselves in many situations if only they were aware of the limitations of their ways of 
coping with the world and were motivated to find and apply improved decision rules. 
Poor search strategies limit the competitive pressures faced by firms and hence may have 
longer-term impacts on welfare via reduced productivity growth or innovation. However, 
in designing policies to promote better search by consumers one must remember that 
many consumers are also workers: higher productivity and better or cheaper goods may 
sometimes come at the cost of people having to work harder.  
To the extent that firms are aware of shortcomings of consumers’ decision-
making processes, they may be in a position to apply this knowledge to manipulate 
choices, for example by how they frame information that is presented to consumers. 
Tendencies for consumers to lack self-control and to fail to reflect on the longer-term 
implications of their choices can very easily result in poor choices when credit is easily 
available. Regulatory policies could do more to promote careful reflection by consumer 
by erecting hurdles to delay choice, as well as by measures to make it easier for 
consumers to make comparisons and see the financial implications of particular choices. 
In designing such policies there is scope for integrating them with policies aimed at the 
promotion of self- funded retirement and environmental wellbeing. 
The paper ends with detailed case study discussions of problems of choice in the 
markets for building renovation services and financial services. In the former, problems 
of finding good value for money are increased by the one-off nature of much of the work 
and by combination of shortages of trades-people relative to demand and large numbers 
of potential suppliers to approach for quotations. The environment is also conducive to 
consumers ending up overcapitalising in their renovations. In the market for financial 
services, the balance of risk-taking with property speculation and suchlike is stacked in 
favour of the loan providers, whilst the chances of inexperienced speculators getting into 
difficulties are enhanced because they are prone to use decision rules they have picked up 
from others belatedly and in simplified form. The implications of borrowing and 
superannuation choices should be made much more transparent to consumers, along with 





Though the economics of microeconomics textbooks is pretty much what it was when 
New Zealand’s process of microeconomic reform began over two decades ago (aside 
from incorporating some material on game theory), this period has seen increasing 
diversity in how economists view the working of markets. For example, we now have a 
much richer view of markets, as collections of social institutions (including the regulatory 
rules of the game) that make it easier for buyers and sellers to do mutually beneficial 
deals (Hodgson, 1988, chapter 8), and there are attempts to view the economy in terms of 
evolutionary ideas and complex systems analysis (Potts, 2000, Dopfer, Foster and Potts, 
2004). Such approaches focus on the role of rules in decision-making, where rules come 
from and how they are changed, rather than focusing on preference orderings and 
engineering-based production functions. At present, the rule-based approach to 
economics is yet to start taking over the core journals but a closely related economics 
research programme known as behavioural economics is attracting considerable interest 
within mainstream circles. In this paper I examine the nature of behavioural economics 
and attempt to see where it offers distinctive implications for the design of regulatory 
policy. The approach that I adopt paints a picture of behavioural economics that is rather 
broader than the version of it that the mainstream scholars are picking up  and is in line 
with the rule-based evolutionary/institutional view of how to approach economics. My 
policy suggestions at times also go beyond mainstream ways of thinking, such as in 
respect of the potential for using interactive websites to prod consumers into taking 
higher-quality decisions. Some of these may be rather too radical for the moment but at 
least they may serve to provoke further lateral thinking about policy.  
The rest of the paper is divided up into nine main sections. Section 2 explores the 
origins of behavioural economics, identifying a number of distinct approaches in different 
parts of the world and points in time. Section 3 examines the meaning of ‘behavioural 
economics’ in methodological terms. Section 4 is a detailed survey of the main 
ingredients of the behavioural view of decision-making processes. Section 5 suggests that 
this view of choice, in which consumers are seen as trying to cope rather than optimising, 
points to the possible value of generalising Leibenstein’s famous (1966, 1976) notion of 
X-inefficiency to the context of consumer behaviour. It argues that the sources of 
consumption X-inefficiency are analogous to those that Leibenstein posited as causes of 
X-inefficiency in organizations. Section 6 examines in general terms the kinds of markets 
in which consumption X-inefficiency is likely to be rife and explores regulatory policies 
that might reduce it. Section 7 is concerned with some of the distributional issues that 
arise from attempts to reduce X-inefficiency. By way of showing in detail how the 
context of consumption can affect wellbeing, there are then two case studies of markets 
with cons iderable potential for improving the quality of consumer choices: section 8 
examines the market for housing renovation products and services, while section 9 





2 ORIGINS OF BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS 
 
Behavioural economics attracted public interest via a pair of New York Times articles on 
11 February 2001 by Uchitelle and Lowenstein. These articles, which focus on the 
careers of US scholars Richard Thaler and David Laibson, give the impression that 
behavioural economics only emerged in the 1990s. So, too, does much of the 
commentary surrounding the joint award of the 2002 Bank of Sweden Prizes in 
Economics in Memory of Alfred Nobel to psychologist Daniel Kahneman (with 
experimental economist Vernon Smith), whose work, with the late Amos Tversky, like 
that of Thaler, has provided striking evidence that people frequently behave in ways that 
are systematically at odds with what is presumed in neoclassical economics. Likewise, 
the back cover of the 2004 collection of articles from about 1990 onwards, edited by 
Camerer, Lowenstein and Rabin, proclaims that ‘Twenty years ago, behavioural 
economics did not exist as a field’. Whilst it may be true that it is only in recent years that 
the economics departments in top US universities have started searching for staff with 
credentials as behavioural economists, the literature of behavioural economics was well-
enough established before then for a two-volume collection of key articles (Earl, ed., 
1988) already to have appeared, which included contributions dating back to 1949.  
In fact, the origins of behavioural economics go back at least a century, to the 
work of Alfred Marshall in Cambridge. Marshall’s (1890, 1919) major works presented a 
view of economics that on the one hand included relatively formal models but on the 
other hand presented a more discursive analysis based on his investigations of the 
ordinary business of everyday life. Marshall had great knowledge of actual business 
practices and hence his less formal analysis emphasized learning processes in firms. He 
also presented consumers as learning agents, in contrast to subsequent models of 
consumers as constrained optimisers with given preferences. Around the same time, 
economic psychology began to emerge in mainland Europe with the work of Gabriel 
Tarde (1892, 1903), whose interest in the impact that social interaction and processes of 
imitation had on choice was echoed by the work of Thorstein Veblen (1899) on the 
status-seeking ‘conspicuous consumption’ of the nouveaux riches in the US. From 
Veblen’s work emerged the ‘Institutionalist’ approach to economics, which has had an 
enduring focus on the significance of habits, rules and codes of conduct on how 
economies work. However, such interest in learning, social interaction and the scope for 
enhancing economic theory by first acquiring knowledge of how economic agents 
actually behave was soon pushed aside as other economists sought to free the discipline 
from any dependence on other social sciences and to make it mathematically rigorous and 
self-contained. 
The Marshallian approach resurfaced in the late 1930s with the work of the 
Oxford Economists’ Research Group (see Young and Lee, 1993). This is best represented 
by the classic volume Oxford Studies in the Price Mechanism (Wilson and Andrews, eds, 
1951), which made considerable use of fieldwork and questionnaires, much to the horror 
of proponents of the emerging quantitative approach to empirical economics. It also 
introduced the idea of mark-up pricing and questioned the extent to which investment 
decisions were affected by changes in monetary policy. After World War II, Martshallian 
methods were followed by Philip Andrews and George Richardson (see Andrews, 1993; 
Richardson, 1998, 1999) at Oxford, and by Penrose (1959). Their work addresses the role 
4 
of information and knowledge (not just ‘know-that’ but also ‘know-how’ and ‘know-
who’) in the development of businesses and the orderly functioning of markets, stressing 
that coordination depends on the web of relationships — such as goodwill, relational 
contracting, interlocking directorships and partial shareholdings — that develops between 
firms and their customers. Andrews emphasized the dependence of demand on access to 
technical information and after-sales support, and on whether or not items were actually 
stocked by retailers and hence capable of being discovered accidentally by consumers 
browsing for other products (cf. also Earl and Potts, 2000). His work leads one to be 
somewhat cautious about deregulating markets to the extent that has occurred in New 
Zealand, such as in respect of parallel importing or, more generally, regarding the 
presumption against manufacturers being allowed to engage in resale price maintenance 
(RPM). (For example, if limits to RPM enable discount retailers of general merchandize  
to cream off sales of best-seller books, videos and recorded music from specialist stores, 
it may have adverse impacts on sales of books, videos and CDs in general due to 
consumers having less reason to visit stores that specialize in selling them and such stores 
being less able to carry slower-selling items because of their losses of high-turnover 
items to the discount retailers.) Finch (1999) offers an analysis of Post-Marshallian 
methods, and emphasizes that they are not the same the so-called ‘grounded theory’ 
approach adopted in some other social sciences.  
Within Europe, interest in bringing economics and psychology together revived 
from the late 1950s onwards, leading eventually to the founding of the Journal of 
Economic Psychology in 1981. It was also a European researcher, George Katona, who 
pioneered psychological research into economic behaviour in the US, as director of the 
Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan and director of its Economic 
Behavior Program from 1946 to 1972. Katona’s work focused mainly on macroeconomic 
topics, such as the role of consumer sentiment in determining the level of consumption 
spending. In affluent economies, demand depends not merely on the ability to spend but 
also on the willingness to do, since much spending is discretionary in nature and 
consumer durables are often replaced long before they are worn out or beyond economic 
repair (see further Katona, 1960, 1975). 
Any account of the emergence of behavioural economics in the US should 
recognize not merely the ‘Michigan School’ led by Katona but also what may be called 
the ‘Carnegie School’ after the work at Carnegie Institute of Technology, later Carnegie-
Mellon University, by Herbert Simon, Richard Cyert and James March in the 1950s and 
1960s, which resulted in Simon being awarded the 1978 Bank of Sweden Prizes in 
Economics in Memory of Alfred Nobel. Their focus was mainly on how inputs from 
psychology could be used, in conjunction with simulation techniques from computing 
science, to understand the behaviour of organizations in complex environments (see 
Cyert and March, 1963, and the papers collected in Simon 1982/1997). It challenged the 
core assumption of neoclassical economics that decision-making involves optimization 
and instead focused on how simple decision rules could bring complex situations within 
the workable grasp of mere mortals with rather limited information processing 
capabilities. This kind of thinking had a major impact on how consumer decision-making 
was seen in marketing (particularly via the work of Bettman, 1979) but economists have 
remained largely oblivious of its effect there, since few of them habitually read the 
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Journal of Consumer Research, where many of the key extensions appeared (see also the 
anthology edited by Earl, 2001a).   
Until relatively recently, the Carnegie- inspired work on consumer behaviour has 
also had rather little cross-fertilisation with work in Europe by economic psychologists 
(Earl and Kemp, eds, 1999, was in part an attempt to bring the two bodies of literature 
together). Affiliated elsewhere but strongly influenced by the Carnegie School were 
Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982), who examined the roles of simplifying 
decision rules in the process of economic growth and the evolution of industries. Some of 
Winter’s earliest work (Winter, 1964) on the behaviour of firms is an important precursor 
to modern research on ‘fast and frugal’ methods of decision making: he sought to show 
that if the environment were continually in a state of flux, firms which adapted quickly to 
their environments using simple decision rules could drive out of business firms that were 
more careful about trying to gather information and then work out an optimal (but 
belated) response. One of the most influential American behavioural economists, Harvey 
Leibenstein shared many of the Carnegie School’s perspectives (see Leibenstein, 1976, p. 
4) but worked independently from them. His view that real-world decision-making 
processes often result in businesses operating well inside their potential, a situation which 
he called X-inefficiency, has had a major impact on policy making. Later in this paper, I 
extend his perspective to the realm of consumer behaviour. 
One final branch of behavioural economics, that is tending to be overlooked by 
revisionist US writings on the rise of behavioural economics, is what I termed, in the 
introduction to Earl (ed.) (1988), as the ‘Stirling School’. This eclectic approach, which 
began at the University of Stirling in Scotland in the 1970s, brings together elements 
from all the other schools of behavioural economics as well as linking up with Austrian 
and evolutionary approaches, focusing on a ‘growth of knowledge’/’problem solving’ 
view of behaviour. It is particularly concerned with the evolution of decision rules, the 
similarities between problems faced by scientists and by people in everyday economic 
life, and the way in which the mental or organizational structures that people create for 
coping with life differ in their resilience in a world of environmental turbulence. The 
elder statesman of this group of scholars is Stirling’s Brian Loasby (1976a, 1999), whose 
influence has extended via Earl (1983, 1984, 1986) to New Zealanders (now expatriates) 
David Harper (1994, 1996) and Jason Potts (2000). 
 
 
3 IN WHAT SENSE IS IT BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS? 
 
As is implied in the previous section’s account of the emergence of the literature of 
behavioural economics, the various approaches have in common the rule that the quality 
of economic theorizing may be improved if theories are based on knowledge of how 
people actually take decisions, rather than being based upon axioms chosen for their 
analytical convenience. A wide variety of sources of such knowledge have been 
employed by behavioural economists, including: 
 
· Research findings from other disciplines in the social and behavioural sciences. 
For example, from cognitive psychology we know that human decision makers 
normally can only process about ten bits of information per second (Marschak, 
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1968). Virtuoso musicians and typists may appear to be able to cope with 
information inputs at a far faster rate but are able to do so mainly by recognizing 
bundles of information as familiar patters (chords or words). It is also known that 
we can only keep in mind Miller’s (1956) ‘magic number 7+2’ things at a time. 
· Laboratory experiments on economic behaviour. Much of this work, which is 
popular with the US behavioural economists, merely involves binary betting 
experiments. However, sometimes it involves ‘stimulus/response’ studies inspired 
by ‘behaviourist’ psychology (see Foxall, ed, 2003). 
· Protocol analysis. Newell and Simon (1972) pioneered this method, which entails 
reports being made to the researcher by subjects whilst they are in the process of 
taking a decision or solving a problem. After analysing data obtained in this way, 
Newell and Simon were able to construct computer programmes that would 
simulate subjects’ problem-solving methods. Ericsson and Simon (1993) is the 
standard source on how to obtain and employ ‘think-aloud protocols’ from 
subjects who have been asked, for example, to describe their thought processes as 
they shop in a supermarket or participate in an experimental economics exercise 
in a computer laboratory.  
· Deconstruction of decision-making examples from text sources.  This method 
draws upon examples of choices from consumer magazines, literature and auto-
biographies, as well as from business and government archives. It is explored in 
Earl and Wakeley (2005). 
· Ethnographic studies, questionnaires and interviews. This category includes the 
pioneering work of the Oxford Economists’ Research Group, but there is also 
considerable potential for economists to act rather like a social anthropologist and 
mingle extensively with decision makers, as in the work of a Abolafia (1996) on 
the Wall Street stock, bond and futures markets, or studies of shopping mall 
behaviour by Underhill (2004). Amongst economic psychologists, there has also 
been considerable research on ‘lay economic beliefs’ (for a review, see Routh, 
1999). 
· Introspection by economists about their own behaviour. This approach was 
developed in marketing by Holbrook (1995) and Gould (1995) and has been used 
in Earl’s (1986, pp. 176-7; 2001b) analyses of, respectively, house buying 
processes and the demand for live music in the age of home theatre systems and 
VCRs/DVD players. The idea here is not that one uses personal experience as a 
means of constructing theories that one then claims to be a priori true, but rather 
that introspection provides a basis for questioning existing analysis and for 
constructing theories that may then be systematically tested.  
· Psychologists’ theories about determinants of behaviour and the associated 
empirical research literature. Examples here include the use of cognitive 
dissonance theory by Akerlof and Dickesn (1982) and other authors reviewed in 
Earl and Wicklund (1999), or insights gleaned from a variety of theories of 
personality, such as Albanese (2002) (psychoanalytic/object relations theory), 
Earl (1983, 1984, 1986) (personal construct theory) and Lutz  and Lux (1979) 




4 KEY ELEMENTS IN THE BEHAVIOURAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Clearly, the behavioural approach is profoundly different in method from the traditional 
way of doing economics that involves a focus on using econometric methods to test 
highly simplified theories that have been put together by arm-chair introspection that 
focuses on the kinds of stories one might tell about economic behaviour in terms of 
favoured mathematical methods. Behavioural economists are not opposed to formalizing 
and econometrically testing their theories, but they prefer to let what is known about 
behaviour drive their choice of techniques rather than letting a prior choice of technique 
shape the kinds of questions they can address. Just as the ‘do’ and ‘don’t’ rules of the 
behavioural research programme differ from traditional economics, so, too, does the set 
of ‘hard-core’ theoretical ideas that its practitioners have come to use and which I will 
now outline (see also Earl, 2005). 
 
1. Opportunity costs and constraints are personally constructed. Action depends on 
how decision-makers perceive their situations: as Latsis (1972) argues, it is not 
‘situationally determined’ and may be affected by how cognitive dissonance is 
resolved. Individuals may see a ‘given’ situation quite differently and construct 
quite different arguments about its pros and cons. 
 
2. Decision making is normally characterised by bounded rationality. As Simon 
(1982/1997) emphasized, people try to avoid making bad decisions but face 
cognitive barriers to formulating and solving complex problems characterized by 
uncertainty and/or information overload. (Note the paradox here: choice can be 
difficult because we simultaneously suffer from too little information of some 
kinds and too much information of other kinds.) 
 
3. Choice is a satisficing activity that attempts to meet aspiration levels, but 
aspiration levels tend eventually to adjust into line with what seems feasible. 
Whilst growing numbers of mainstream economists have accepted the notion of 
bounded rationality, they have tended to do so in terms of their standard 
optimising framework, for example, by modelling agents as though they keep 
searching until the marginal benefits to search equate the marginal costs of 
searching (though how can they know what they are likely to discover?), or 
trading off the benefits of obtaining more information against the risks of being 
more likely to make mistakes in processing it. Behavioural economists, by 
contrast, reject optimisation on the basis that if there is uncertainty and a need to 
allocate attention and gather information to deal with problems that may or may 
not have arisen or be about to arise, then one runs into an infinite regress (Elster, 
1984, p. 135; Berger, 1989): for example, how does one search for the best search 
rule, or work out how to attend to the question of what one should be attending to 
right now? Simple thresholds cut-offs that determine whether a problem is judged 
to exist, or whether one starts to pay attention to something, provide stopping 
rules to avoid the infinite regress problem. (A useful analogy here is that of fire-
fighting behaviour: life is too complicated and too high-pressure to permit the 
construction of fire-proof systems, so instead one tackles fires that do break out 
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once they seem to have crossed thresholds of danger; if a number of fires are 
burning at once, we may use a priority system — what Cyert and March, 1963, 
call sequential attention to goals — to decide which ones to fight first.) 
Such cut-offs make good sense in philosophical terms and in practice 
people seem cope with the pressures of life by limiting their attention only to 
those areas where they are at any moment failing to meet what they have judged 
to be reasonable goals to have set. (Notes that what one person sees as a 
reasonable goal may be quite different from what another person aims for in the 
same situation.) If it is the things that cross our cognitive thresholds that grab our 
attention, then we should not be surprised to find that shopping malls and in-
stores displays are designed to divert us from what we are trying to focus on 
doing, or that advertisements have to shout as loud as they do to stand out in the 
midst of other attempts to divert us in different directions (see further Earl and 
Potts, 2000).  
   
4. Choice can be based on reasoning in terms of decision rules, and on emotions, 
but choices that involve reasoning are impossible without an emotional anchor. 
The anchoring for choice that emotions provide is another aspect of how humans 
deal with the infinite regress problem tha t would otherwise paralyse us into 
indecision and which has indeed been found to paralyse people who have suffered 
particular kinds of brain damage (Damasio, 1994). For example, having a non-
negotiable view of one’s identity provides a set of boundaries for rules about how 
one might behave: without it, one has no basis for choosing amongst possible 
rules for choosing; with it, one can choose possible decision rules on the basis of 
what they would imply for the question of self- identity. Recognition of these non-
negotiable parts of our lives — where ‘I believe it/do it because I do, period’ — is 
about as close as a behaviour economist gets to the idea in traditional economics 
that choices are a reflection of ‘given’ sets of preferences. 
 
5. The forms that decision rules take may vary considerably depending on how 
decision makers see the context of choice.  Whereas traditional economics offers a 
‘one size fits all’ approach to choice, the behavioural economist is open to the 
possibility that in some situations cho ices may be made using highly simplified 
decision rules, whereas in other situations people may go through a process of 
extended problem solving. The latter is often characterized as a ‘decision cycle’ 
involving six stages: 
 
(i) Problem recognition. (This will be determined by the size of one’s 
aspirations, as well as the level of one’s current attainments.) 
(ii) Search for possible solutions. (This will require choices about how to 
search, for example by using a particular trade magazine or seeking advice 
from someone — and a means of avoiding infinite regress.) 
(iii) Evaluation of alternatives. (With certain kinds of products, much 
uncertainty will remain.) 
(iv) Choice. (This is the only stage that traditional theory covers.) 
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(v) Implementation. (In practice, the preferred option may turn out not to be 
possible — in which case, the consumer needs to have a rule for a fall-
back position or to return to stage (i).) 
(vi) Hindsight review. (Did the action solve the problem/did it create a new 
problems?) 
 
The first three stages in the decision cycle can be seen as involving the assembly 
of a matrix of information about possible choices and their imagined implications 
in terms of characteristics, while the fourth involves testing to see if at least one 
possibility is satisfactory and, if more than one possibility passes this test, to 
break a tie between those that do.  
Decision rules may involve different ways of scanning/processing 
information in a choice matrix. An individual consumer may use different types 
of rules in different situations, while in any given situation different consumers 
may be using different decision rules. Some may compute overall scores based on 
performances across a limited (7+2) set of characteristics and are prepared to 
accept any product that has a high enough overall score. This is essentially a 
satisficing version of traditional thinking about choice: a poor performance in one 
dimension could be offset by a superior performance in another. Others may use 
rules that do not involve adding up procedures and work more like an intolerant 
filtering process: the consume may initially try to apply a checklist and if any 
product has all the required features in adequate amounts, then it is deemed 
acceptable, whilst if none survive this test the consumer may bring into play a 
subsidiary priority rule, subjecting all the contenders to the same initial test and 
only allowing on to the next test those that are good enough to pass the first test, 
and so on. With this kind of rule, a single failing in a high priority area may be 
fatal, regardless of how well the product performs in other areas. Such a rule may 
initially seem irrational but it is cognitively much simpler to operate and may still 
result in the consumer being able to find products that meet all, or many, of their 
priorities, so long as their aspirations are not out of line with typical performance 
standards in the product area in question. Sometimes, as when buying a house, 
decision makers may begin the process of choice by using an intolerant checklist 
to define a manageable ‘short list’, which they then appraise in detail in terms of a 
more tolerant, adding-up procedure. Many other hybrid intolerant/trade-off 
combinations may be observed — such as to choose the product with the longest 
list of peripheral features provided it seems to offer good enough performance in 
all the core areas. 
From the behavioural standpoint, the use of checklists and priority ranking 
procedures by buyers provides significant clues towards understanding processes 
of non-price competition in international trade and the likely effectiveness of 
exchange rate adjustments as means of correcting trade imbalances in the long 
run. If firms in high-wage economies are having trouble making good goods, a 
mainstream economist might suggest they retreat down-market. Such a strategy’s 
long-run prospects are limited if firms in newly industrializing nations are raising 
their standards as well as enjoying low-wage cost advantages (see further Earl, 
1986, chapter 10). 
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 Much simpler decision rules may provide perfectly viable ways of 
reaching a decision, such as (i) Choose the product with the best performance in 
a particular, single dimension; (ii) Choose the top-selling product in the category 
(though of course we might note that a million lemmings can be wrong!); or (iii) 
Choose the underdog brand on the basis that they must be trying harder and 
could therefore be under-rated (cf. Avis versus Hertz in the rental car market). 
 
6. Decision makers learn in the sense of changing how they look at the world, but 
their ways of looking at the world may limit their ability to change how they see 
things (Kelly, 1955; Loasby 1983). Psychologists themselves have a variety of 
ways of looking at learning processes, such as in terms of conditioning via reward 
or punishment, or in terms of systems of rules (contrast Foxall, 1997, and 
Brenner, 1999). Just how important it may be for world-views to change if 
effective economic policy making is to be conducted may be illustrated by the 
contrast between attitudes to drinking recycled water in the UK and Australia. In 
London, it is seen as normal and safe to drink recycled water, whereas in Sydney 
water supply problems are greatly compounded by the fears that consumers have 
about what they see as ‘drinking sewage’, a point of view which seems also to 
pervade the minds of politicians and water utility managers. 
 
7. Agency has an inherently social nature. This greatly expands the ability of a 
group so long as members are sufficiently different and sufficiently similar in 
appropriate dimensions (such as capabilities and perceptions about what ought to 
be done). However, it can also have dysfunctional aspects. For example, if people 
construct their identities and self- images by comparing and contrasting 
themselves with others, then the result is likely to be a competitive spiral of 
choices aimed at defending such constructions of social status. Duesenberry 
(1949) explored this in his classic contribution to the theory of the consumption 
function, a work that drew on the social psychology of its time. Nowadays, it is 
widely accepted within behavioural economics that wellbeing is more a function 
of relative rather than absolute levels of consumption (as well as of perceptions of 
how far one is in control of one’s life and of one’s way of looking at the world). 
 
8. It is not uncommon for consumer or workplace behaviour to be to some degree 
pathological in nature. The need for regulatory policies is much more obvious is 
one sees some consumers as prone to addictive or impulsive behaviour and hence 
in need of protection from themselves as well as from businesses seeking to 
exploit their weaknesses.  
 
9. Perceptions and judgments under uncertainty are commonly shaped by heuristics 
and biases, that conflict with mainstream analysis and competent use of statistical 
techniques. This is the major theme in the recent US-dominated work, but these 
heuristics and biases have been known about in psychology and management for 
quite a while (classic sources are Nisbett and Ross, 1980, Hogarth, 1980, and 
Kahneman et al., eds, 1982) and Thaler’s influential (1980) paper (reprinted in 
Earl, ed., 1988, volume II) also appeared a quarter of a century ago. The coverage 
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here lists them under headings based around the decision cycle notion, following 
the approach taken in a very useful survey article by Hogarth and Makridakis 
(1981, reprinted in Earl, ed., 1988, volume I); for an even more comprehensive 
and more recent survey, see Conlisk (2001) and for popularising applications see 
Thaler (1992) and Belsky and Gilovich (1999).    
 
Heuristics and biases in acquiring information 
· Availability bias — judgments is affected by the ease of recall of 
examples/frequency with which events are publicized rather than being 
proportionate to frequency of occurrence. 
· Selective perception — people tend to see what they expect to see, downplay 
counter-examples and seek verification for their expectations rather than 
looking for anomalies. 
· Concrete information dominates over abstract, statistical information. 
· The use of frequency, not relative frequency, to judge the strength of 
predictive relationships. 
· Illusory correlation — people often select inappropriate variables as supposed 
causes of particular phenomena. 
· The focus of decision makers depends on how data are presented — for 
example, quantitative data may inhibit concentration on qualitative data, or 
vice versa; which items of information are absorbed may depend on their 
places in a sequence of pieces of information, while seemingly logical 
displays of data may distract people from crucial data that are missing, and so 
on. 
· Framing effects — for example, how inclined a person is to search to save 
money on a product may depend on the proportionate saving that he or she 
thinks it might be possible to achieve, rather than the absolute amount, even 
though a one percent saving on, say, a $10,000 car is more than a 10 per cent 
saving on a $500 in-car entertainment system. 
 
Heuristics and biases in processing information 
· Tendencies to treat small probabilities as zero probabilities and large 
probabilities as certainties, or to avoid thinking in terms of a range of possible 
outcomes and instead focus only a single ‘best guess’. 
· Poor understanding of compound probabilities. 
· Tendencies to fail to use a consistent judgmental strategy over repeated cases. 
· Law of small numbers — giving too much weight to small sample results. 
· Tendencies to discount the future hyperbolically, not exponentially, which can 
make people prone problems of addiction. 
· Superficial evaluation in the face of complexity/emotional stress, resulting in 
impulsive choices. 
· Social pressures tend to cause judgments to be distorted in favour of the 
majority view, however ill- founded it might be (as in the story of The 
Emperor’s New Clothes). 
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Heuristics and biases in choice 
· Sunk cost bias — as where a person consumes something (say, the facilities of 
a fitness club) because they have already spent money enabling them to do so; 
their continued consumption of it is a way of making their expenditure seem 
justified, even though, if they could ‘turn the clock back’, they would not 
consume it even if it were available without any charge. 
· Endowment effect — how much a person will require to give up something 
they already have tends to be more than what they would have been willing to 
pay to acquire it in the first place. 
· Illusion of control — the very act of making a choice can make people feel 
less worried about uncertainties that they earlier perceived. 
· Wishful thinking — to make a choice seem appropriate when it is being taken 
for reasons that they are reluctant or unable to admit to themselves or others, 
people tend to inflate their estimates of its payoffs in other dimensions. 
· Those who are aware of their fallibility as decision makers tend to pursue self-
control strategies to prevent themselves from being led into temptation, even 
though they know that these strategies promise them less than they would be 
able to achieve if they chose alternative strategies that depended on them 
being able to control themselves. (For example, some consumers voluntarily 
open Christmas Club Savings Accounts that offer miserly rates of interest but 
have the advantage of being impossible to access for withdrawals until 
Christmas approaches.)  
 
Post-choice heuristics and biases 
· ‘Gambler’s fallacy’ — after observing a run of one kind of outcome, people 
begin to assume odds of its rival happening are increasing. Attribution bias — 
people tend to see success as due to their own skill, but failure as due to ‘bad 
luck’. 
· Mental recall problems, that cause erroneous reconstructions of what 
happened and affect subsequent choices. 
· Hindsight bias — people tend to be able to find plausible explanations for 
things that in prospect would have been surprising to them. 
 
In short, from the behavioural standpoint, choice is an unfolding process of coping with 
the complexities of everyday life in a changing world, not the selection of an optimal set 
of activities at a point in time.  
 
 
5 X-INEFFICIENCY IN CONSUMPTION 
 
From the standpoint of behavioural theories of the firm, the policies of market 
deregulation pursued in New Zealand over the past two decades or so make sense, 
broadly speaking, as means of raising business productivity: increased competitive  
pressure is likely to have forced firms to raise their aspirations in terms of 
product/productivity standards, leading them to engage in problem solving activities and 
develop their capabilities. In terms of Leibenstein’s (1966, 1976) work, policies of 
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deregulation are likely to have reduced X-inefficiency, shifting cost curves downwards, 
as well as reducing allocative inefficiency by limiting opportunities for capturing 
consumer surplus through monopolistic pricing. This, however, is rather a one-eyed view, 
as competitive pressure comes not just from rival firms but also from consumers who 
demand better deals and are willing to shop around until they find them. Recognition of 
this implies scope for bringing behavioural perspectives on choice together as a consumer 
theory analogue to Leibenstein’s work on X-inefficiency in the context of the theory of 
the firm. This is what I attempt to do in this section. The basic proposition here is very 
straightforward: whereas X-inefficient firms achieve lower productivity than they might 
have been able to achieve, X-inefficient consumers pay more to meet their goals, or to 
obtain particular bundles of consumption characteristics, than they needed to do, or they 
fail to meet goals they could have achieved had they used their resources differently. In 
both cases, the extent of X-inefficiency may be affected by competitive pressures and by 
the regulatory context in which decisions are taken.   
 Leibenstein (1976, p. 45) argues that X-inefficiency in production has four main 
causes: 
 
(i) The production function is imperfectly known. 
(ii) Employment contracts are imperfectly specified, allowing workers discretion 
in the amount and quality of the work they provide. 
(iii) The market for factors of production is imperfect, particularly that for 
managerial knowledge. Hence managers who might be best suited for 
reorganizing production methods and motivating workers in a particular 
context may be working in other contexts that fit their capabilities less well. 
(iv)  In the face of uncertainty and competitive interdependence, firms tend to 
imitate each other, cooperating tacitly rather than competing aggressively and 
thereby pushing each other to search for better ways of doing things. 
 
In the context of consumer behaviour, unexploited opportunities for improving wellbeing 
may exist for an analogous set of reasons: 
 
(i) Consumers have limited knowledge about the set of consumption possibilities and 
about how goods may be combined to best effect as elements in their household 
production systems. 
To obtain relevant knowledge, consumers need either to be able to pick it up passively 
and retain it during the course of everyday life, for example via social interaction, the 
media or from advertisements, or they need actively to seek it as a means of solving 
particular consumption problems. Though the Internet offers many sites that can help 
consumers resolve puzzles about what to buy and where to buy it, the severity of the 
knowledge problem faced by boundedly rational consumers still needs to be emphasized, 
since: 
 
· The range of products on offer at any time is enormous: a typical supermarket 
illustrates the problem by offering upwards of 10,000 product lines (if one has the 
opportunity, is it more efficient to shop at Aldi, a German-based chain, which only 
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carries about 700 lines?), but even this seems restricted compared with the millions of 
book titles and other products that one can source via Amazon.com. 
· The set of available products is constantly changing due to technological change and 
the rise and fall of firms operating as suppliers in any particular market. As Lancaster 
(1966b) reminds us, new products do not necessitate forming new preferences if 
preferences are for characteristics offered by goods and new products essentially offer 
new combinations of characteristics, i.e. new ways of meeting established goals or 
solving familiar kinds of problems. However, the new goods must first be discovered 
and their characteristics identified. Thus, for example, a home theatre system may be 
a new way of dealing with the problem of how to reconcile watching movies and 
bringing up young children: instead of paying for baby-sitting whilst out at a cinema, 
one can internalise both the child supervision and the movie viewing facilities, 
gaining flexibility at the cost of making a major fixed investment and some delay in 
access to latest movies. The trouble is, there are many possibilities for a home theatre 
system — different wall-projection technologies, projector televisions, or large-screen 
plasma or LCD products — of uncertain reliability and with differences in picture 
quality and likelihood of falling in price. 
· Today’s consumers are dealing with goods that are far more complex than they were 
when economics began: products are often multi- function devices based upon 
multiple technologies, so the appreciation of which high- level characteristics they 
deliver or which wants and needs they serve may require considerable expertise. 
Their effective use, too, requires skills: perhaps nothing symbolizes this better this 
better than the blinking, unset clock on many people’s VCRs. Much of what we know 
about what our possessions have to offer comes after we have purchased them and 
many features we may simply never discover or use due to a failure to allocate 
enough time to read all the instructions or inability to commit them to memory. 
Features that manufacturers build into their products in attempting to offer superior 
‘surprise and delight’ may not be noticed or be ‘too clever by half’. 
· Whereas mainstream consumer theory emphasizes substitution between products, the 
behavioural approach emphasizes the complementarity between products, the full 
exploitation of which requires knowledge of how they interact as systems within the 
higher- level system that is the consumer’s lifestyle (Earl, 1986). For example, cars 
may differ in their suitability for towing boats, shopping at IKEA, their fit with our 
garages (not just in terms of length, but also height if we are choosing an SUV, or 
width if some have long doors) or the images we are trying to present, and so on. 
Similarly, choosing clothing offers major potential for strategic choices of items that 
will enable new outfits to be created in combination with items of clothing we already 
have, but it also offer major potential for showing our lack of sense of style.  
· To obtain knowledge efficiently, one needs to know what questions are worth asking 
when shopping. Unfortunately, in many markets, consumers are active very 
infrequently so their knowledge is harder to update than where they purchase it ems 
often and can see trends at work from which they can derive a sense of the questions 
they need to ask to update their knowledge incrementally. 
· Some kinds of infrequently consumed products need to be purchased at short notice, 
which limits scope for gathering information about rival suppliers’ offerings. Obvious 
examples here are services of plumbers if one has a burst pipe or blocked drains, 
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funeral services, or tourism products purchased by consumers who are staying only a 
limited time at a particular tourism centre. However, many purchases made by people 
who have just relocated to a new country and are trying to get established 
domestically in the midst of starting new jobs will be made under the same time 
pressures. 
· The durable nature of many consumer products complicates the task of knowing 
which ones to buy. This is not merely because it leaves scope for choosing the timing 
of replacements in the light of guesses about the pace of technological change and 
lower prices that may be available if consumers opt to delay upgrading and continue 
to use existing products. It also introduces the need for knowledge about likely repair 
and depreciation costs, which may differ substantially between rival brands. 
 
(ii) The terms under which consumers purchase goods and service involve incomplete 
specifications of what is to be delivered, which leaves scope for opportunistic 
behaviour by suppliers who may choose to act deviously and exploit to their 
advantage what has actually been spelt out in the deal. 
Quite apart from the problem of gathering and retaining information, consumers in the 
real world of bounded rationality may be unable to spell out precisely what they expect 
from supplier (this is an example of the ‘tacit knowledge’ problem raised by Polanyi, 
1962, 1967, and discussed by Nelson and Winter, 1982) or unable to verify what they 
actually received. There may be good reasons for leaving specifications rather vague: 
contracts with lots of fine print are costly to draw up, time-consuming to evaluate, leave 
less scope for changing what is supplied to match unexpected contingencies that arise 
after the deal has been done (Loasby, 1976b) and, besides, the supplier may be suffering 
from the tacit knowledge problem, too, despite greater experience in the area. However, 
contractual vagueness combined with a situation of asymmetric information (or, in the 
terms of Williamson, 1985, ‘information impactedness’) puts the consumer at risk of 
exploitation. This risk is increased if the consumer does not engage in due diligence 
because, despite the incompleteness of the contract, there is enough fine print to make it 
seem overwhelming. (For example, how many jet- lagged consumers really do read the 
fine print of their rental car contracts before signing, especially when they have a queue 
behind them?) 
 The issue of what information the consumer has about what is being supplied 
needs to be seen in relation to the consumer’s knowledge of the significance of what is 
being said and unsaid in the contract. Consider car safety, for example. This is an area 
where it is intrinsically hard to spell out the extent of protection a vehicle affords, as this 
depends on its ability to avoid accidents, reduce the speed of impact and mitigate the 
consequences of impact. If consumers cannot see the underlying structure of a car, they 
may take lists of safety features as proxies for safety. Some features (for example, ‘side 
airbags are fitted as standard’) may be cheap to incorporate in re-skinned, modern-
looking products that do not embody state-of-the-art structural engineering and may give 
the illusion that the product is more than a match for newer designs with superior 
structural integrity. 
 
(iii) Consumers’ decision making capabilities in general fall well short of what is 
required for optimal choices but in any case are by no means guaranteed to match 
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the problem solving tasks that their positions of income and wealth present. 
This is a key theme to emerge from the behavioural literature surveyed earlier in this 
paper, but it is important to be aware of differences of emphasis and focus within 
different groups of behavioural economists in respect of it. Much of the recent US-
dominated literature focuses on widespread human tendencies to make errors, such as a 
general susceptibility to engage in ‘framing’ or a failure to treat sunk costs as sunk. The 
literature includes easy-to-read self-help books that may play a useful role in reducing 
consumption X-inefficiency (for example, Belsky and Gilovich, 1999, Gigerenzer, 1999). 
However, it rather tends to distract attention from the capacity of many decision makers 
to develop ‘fast and frugal’ decision heuristics (Gigerenzer et al., 2002) for coping with 
the kinds of knowledge problems we have been considering. Hence behavioural 
economists such as myself, who work from an evolutionary standpoint, tend to prefer to 
focus more on the match between specific decision heuristics that people use and their 
contexts of application.  
Suppose, for example, we are looking at the welfare of households in poverty. 
Some may have trouble meeting basic needs because they use decision rules that lead 
them to find it difficult to obtain or keep a job, or make them prone to fritter away much 
of their income on addictive products. Others may be short of income because they made 
a bad choice of partner and have been left as single parents. The latter may caught in a 
poverty trap with costs of childcare and transport, and income tax, making it impossible 
to raise their purchasing power by working or investing in their human capital via 
education. Yet, within their limited means, the latter may be shrewd jugglers of 
resources, skilled at getting by on what little they have. The former suffer from consumer 
X-inefficiency: they would make poor use of additional welfare handouts and need to be 
trained to be better decision makers — put in more psychological terms, they need 
therapy to overcome their pathological tendencies — if they are to improve their well-
being in the long term. The latter, by contrast, would thrive if given a way of breaking out 
of the poverty trap.  
 Different kinds of decision-making competence issues arise further up the income 
and wealth ladder, including other kinds of consumption pathologies (such as Imelda 
Marcos- like tendencies to accumulate dozens of designer-brand shoes). Whereas 
mainstream consumer theory assumes complete preference orderings, reality may be that 
when we are promoted into a bigger feasible consumption space we have rather limited 
ideas about what we are getting into and what we should expect to be able to achieve. If 
armed with decision rules developed for coping in ‘down-market’ segments, the 
consumer may be prone to make sub-optimal choice on ‘arriving’ in a more affluent part 
of society. Several problems may be noted here:  
 
· Such consumers are likely to be easily impressed by products that are so much 
better than what they are used to even if the ones they have so far seen are by no 
means the best of what is available within their new budget range. Search may 
thus stop too soon because aspiration levels have not yet risen enough. 
· Consumers may lack capacity for choosing status symbols that demonstrate they 
have cracked the social codes of entry into the group that they seek to join. We 
might call this the ‘nouveau riche problem’, where consumers show they have 
‘made it’ by spending on large houses and cars, ostentatious jewellery, gold bath 
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taps, etc. All of this may show a lack of appreciation of style and quality and a 
failure to realize that understated consumption, where ‘less is more’, can show 
both one’s wealth and one’s good taste (see Parsons, 1967).  
· If the rich are too busy making money to have time to shop, they are likely to fall 
prey to established ‘designer brands’ that achieve brand equity through 
bandwagon effects and snobbery rather than by offering correspondingly higher 
value for money.  
· Newly elevated consumers may be prone to buy products with specifications 
vastly in excess of what they actually require for meeting their goals, because they 
copy the choices of others in their new social reference groups. The latter may 
have done exactly the same in the past, with very few consumers actually 
possessing the insight or capabilities to extract from their choices the value 
inherent in them. Such choices represent a cause for concern in terms of overall 
welfare, for three reasons: they may generate envy on the part of those who know 
how to enjoy such products more fully in functional terms but do not have the 
money to purchase them; financial risks may have been incurred to obtain them; 
and higher environmental costs may be associated with their production and use. 
 
These social considerations take us straight to the consumer X-inefficiency analogue of 
Leibenstein’s fourth source of X-inefficiency on the production side. 
 
(iv) In the face of uncertainty, consumers tend to copy each other’s behaviour and 
follow conventions, and ostracize those who use their superior knowledge as a tool 
of aggressive social competition. 
Social interaction plays a major role in reducing consumption X-inefficiency as it enables 
consumers to specialize in the areas in which they acquire expertise and then trade that 
expertise with each other by processes of social barter (Earl and Potts, 2004). However, 
as with social interaction between lemmings, borrowing decision rules from others can 
sometimes be costly. The development of well- functioning decision rules is likely to be 
enhanced by diversity in the rules that are socially popular at any time, but processes of 
social competition work against this. Those whose choices flout conventions (cf. Choi, 
1993) will be called upon to justify their deviant behaviour since it poses a challenge to 
the norm. Hence would-be deviants may opt for the quiet life of conformity rather than 
looking for a better way or following it should they discover it. (This is especially likely 
in a market such as that for cars, where a deviant choice carries the cost not merely of 
social inquisition but also much more rapid depreciation.) Whilst deviant actions may be 
problematic enough in some social circles even if undertaken quietly and based on sound 
knowledge, it definitely is not the ‘done thing’ to go about professing one’s superior 
knowledge actively. Unless conducted with great tactfulness, such behaviour is likely to 
result in charges that one is a ‘know-it-all’, an epithet that normally carries pejorative 
connotations.  
Consumers who have ‘done their homework’ may thus face a dilemma when 
moving in, or into, social circles where there is considerable consumption X-inefficiency: 
buying the best value product (for example, a Skoda Octavia is essentially the same 
product under the skin as a much higher-status Audi A3) may be seen as a social faux 
pas. If most consumers were well informed about what they were buying, it is doubtful 
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that a firm such as the Volkswagen-Audi Group could continue to engage in price 
discrimination by offering brands of differently perceived levels of status for 
correspondingly different prices. 
The social transmission of decision rules amongst consumers has potential to be 
problematic even where there is receptivity to rules promulgated by experts. Just as 
information can be degraded on transmission between people, or messages get 
completely distorted as they are passed from person to person in the playground game 
‘Chinese whispers’, so, in a ‘decision rule cascade’ (Earl, Peng and Potts, 2005), complex 
rules are likely to suffer loss of definition as they are passed between boundedly rational 
consumers. This phenomenon is redolent of technology transfer problems associated with 
tacit knowledge gaps between firms and their subsidiaries or licensees, that result in the 




6 REGULATION AND THE PROMOTION OF EFFICIENT CONSUMER 
CHOICE 
 
Before we consider ways of using regulatory policy to try to ensure consumers get better 
value from the money they spend, it is important to recognize that just as firms may pay 
for the services of management consultants to try to reduce X-inefficiency, so consumers 
who are alert to the scale of the task they face when making a complex choice and who 
are open to their own fallibility may provide a ready market for suppliers of advice on 
what to buy to solve a particular problem and where to buy it most cheaply (or even 
negotiate on their behalf, as with car brokers). Such consumers still have a problem, that 
of knowing which advice to purchase and/or take seriously. The need to be a canny 
shopper is also reduced by the presence of market institutions such as trade associations 
that set and police standards of conduct on behalf of their members. More generally, we 
might say that the more demanding is the population at large, then the smaller the risk 
that a minority of naïve or lazy shoppers will end up doing needlessly poorly when they 
shop. Consumer X-inefficiency is also likely to be less the more that members of a 
country’s population are able to travel widely and see what people in other cultures are 
able to obtain by being more diligent and assertive as shoppers. Demands for better value 
via such demonstration effects may be manifest not merely when shopping but also via 
the ballot box, with consumers voting for politician who promise to open up their 
economies to the winds of global competition. (According to Colin James, 1996, the 
acceptability of deregulatory polices in New Zealand was partly a consequence of cheap 
air travel, which allowed increasing numbers of its population to see the larger range of 
choice and better value for money enjoyed by their counterparts in less protected 
economies)  
A useful starting point for analysing the need to regulate consumer markets is the 
classification of products into three categories: search goods, experience goods and 
credence goods (Nelson, 1970). From the standpoint of mainstream economics, search 
goods do not present a problem in need of a regulatory solution, for these are products 
where, in principle, characteristics of rival brands can be discovered prior to purchase. 
From the behavioural standpoint, however, regulatory policy can reduce risks that 
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consumers will make errors due to inefficient search and problems in evaluating 
information. Requiring automakers to publish star-rating standards for their cars’ 
performances in independent crash-testing programmes greatly simplifies the consumer’s 
task of finding out about safety. Likewise, having local content requirements in music 
broadcasting is a way of ensuring that consumers in small economies are exposed to local 
artists whose work they might not otherwise have discovered in record stores after being 
bombarded by the music of heavily promoted international stars. We might also note that 
it may be inadequate merely to require firms to list ingredients on food and cosmetics 
products, given the difficulties consumers have in remembering what may be hazardous 
even if they are aware they may need to be careful about certain ingredients. (For 
example, how dangerous is it to buy shampoo containing sodium laurel sulphate?) 
Mainstream economists may also be rather sceptical of the need for regulation in 
the case of experience goods, defined as those goods whose characteristics buyers can 
only discover, at least in part, after purchase. Suppliers have an incentive to mitigate 
quality uncertainty problems by offering warranties or by presenting hostages (such as 
investments in international brands that could be ruined by individual incidents involving 
bad publicity: see Klein and Leffler, 1981) and because they run the risk that disgruntled 
buyers will vent their bitter experiences on the Internet, as with eBay and Amazon.com 
satisfaction ratings. From the behavioural standpoint, however, we would note that 
getting redress requires assertiveness while lay consumers may not think in terms of the 
‘hostage’ logic and scope for publicizing disappointing products may be limited. Some 
examples of problematic experience goods that could be candidates for regulation 
include: 
 
· Local tourism services consumed by non- local tourists, such as taxis and guided 
tours (but not internationa l brands of hotels or motel networks). Such consumers 
lack local knowledge and may find it difficult to voice their displeasure for 
reasons of language, or feel disinclined to do so because they intend never to visit 
the destination again. 
· Products with an embarrassment factor, such as dating agencies. 
· Phone services, where there may be changes of prices and services after the 
contract has been signed (Colton, 1993), and switching costs. 
 
Credence goods are products whose consumption payoffs remain unclear to 
purchasers even after they have been consumed, such as dietary supplements, some kinds 
of car maintenance work, or some financial, medical and legal services. Some products 
that appear to be credence goods might be reducible to search goods if the regulatory 
authorities can expose the truth about whether they work or not, or at least can publicize 
what expert opinion says about them. With hard-core cases of credence goods, however, 
it may be intrinsically difficult for the consumer to judge whether a service has been 
performed, or if it has been performed in a way that has actually made the consumer’s 
wellbeing different from what it otherwise would have been. If so, the market discipline 
mechanisms may fail: they cannot know whether to complain and/or warn others in their 
social networks about being under- or over-serviced. 
In the absence of regulations and government monitoring, the quality of deals 
obtained by purchasers of credence goods may to some degree be assured via the 
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certification of suppliers by professional bodies that establish codes of conduct and may 
be able to audit members’ behaviour. However, policing processes may fail if debarring 
of members would put the entire group under suspicion. In some cases, suppliers can try 
to eliminate princ ipal-agent problems by specializing only in providing recommendations 
or in carrying out work that has been recommended by another agent. Otherwise, buyers 
at best must get by via using whatever rules they use to judge trustworthiness, such as 
how long the supplier has been in business. 
A broader analysis of whether there is a need to regulate some markets sees the 
issue in terms of whether policy-makers need to protect consumers from their own lack of 
industriousness as shoppers, versus whether consumers need to be protected against the 
attempts of firms to engage in market manipulation. Waterson (2003) exemplifies the 
former view, whereas the latter is the subject of major papers by lawyers Hanson and 
Kysar (1999a, 1999b), who hypothesize that the tighter competition becomes between 
firms, the more they will find it necessary to try to manipulate consumer behaviour in 
order to win viable numbers of customers from rivals.  
Waterson’s recognition that economists have been over-estimating the canniness of 
consumers was triggered partly by his analysis of the limited extent to which consumers 
have responded to their increased ranges of choice following deregulation of markets 
such as those for public utilities. He had also noticed that the willingness of consumers to 
switch suppliers is a key determinant of profitability in financial services: in vehicle 
insurance, switching is frequent and profit margins are very low, whereas in banking 
switching is infrequent and profit margins are high. Partly this reflects differences in time 
and/or hassle costs of switching, while benefits of switching banks are unclear due to the 
long-term/relationship basis of the services they provide. Even so, the reluctance of bank 
customers to switch to get a better deal appears to imply very high rates of discounting of 
benefits of switching insofar as benefits are known.  
The implication that the context of choice might affect the extent to which people 
are willing to shop around and switch suppliers is further evident in Waterson’s paper 
when he discusses how competition has changed in markets for products such as 
condoms, whose purchase may be a rather furtive activity. The way that firms compete in 
the condom market has changed with changes in public attitudes that have occurred in 
tandem with a shift from ‘over the counter’ to ‘self-service’ retailing that allows price 
comparisons to be done by the consumer without the need to ask embarrassing questions 
of the retailer. 
Like most of his fellow industrial economists, however, Waterson seems virtually 
oblivious of the behavioural economics literature on consumer choice. He comments that 
economists have not ‘looked much into how or what advertising works on some 
consumers, or why consumers engage in more search for some goods than others’ 
(Waterson, 2003, p. 146). (The implied very high rates of discount in many of his 
examples of inefficient consumer behaviour will come as no surprise to economists 
familiar with Ainslie’s (1992) book Picoeconomics, which focuses on the common 
tendency to discount hyperbolically rather than exponentially.) Hanson and Kysar, by 
contrast, make extensive use of behavioural research in their attempt to demonstrate that 
firms can, and do, use insights from it to influence choices. Ploys include the following: 
 
· Fear appeals. 
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· Diversion of attention from hazards of thrill-seeking products. 
· Shaping perceptions of product safety. 
· Misrepresenting the environmentally friendliness of products. 
· One-sided use of ‘expert’ (but partial) opinion. 
· Strategic use of framing effects (for example, presenting food products as 75 per 
cent fat-free, not as 25 per cent fat!). 
· Exploitation of psychological thresholds (just noticeable differences). 
· Misrepresenting products as ‘New’, ‘Special’, etc. 
· Careful management of the ‘atmosphere’ of purchasing environment.  
  
The analyses of Waterson and of Hanson and Kysar differ sharply in their policy 
implications. Waterson’s key conclusion is that if search costs are significant, policies 
aimed at increasing the number of suppliers may not be effective at pushing prices down 
towards costs. Instead, regulators should try to simplify search tasks by imposing 
standards of quality and making pricing transparent; or they may increase incentives to 
search by reducing switching costs. Likewise, if consumers are prone to suffer harmful 
consequences of choice because they are insufficiently diligent or cannot obtain adequate 
information, the policy role is to improve information availability/incentives for 
consumers to be diligent. However, if they are prey to attempts of firms systematically 
trying to shape their behaviour, then policymakers need to regulate practices of firms or 
give firms incentives not to misrepresent their products (such as full legal liability for 
firms to compensate consumers for harm suffered when using the products, even if this 
would discourage diligence on the part of consumers).  
Policies implied by the behavioural literature to promote search by consumers 
include the following: 
 
· Consumers might be legally required to seek multiple quotations before they can 
undertake certain kinds of transactions. Whether or not they had done so would be 
relatively easy to monitor using Internet-accessible electronic databases to which 
quotation numbers might be logged, with electronic bars on expediting orders 
unless the requisite number of quotations had been logged. 
· Require that suppliers of ongoing services can only contract for finite periods 
before a fresh contract has to be offered (i.e. following the example of motor 
vehicle insurance, in contrast to current account banking services). 
· Require suppliers to compare their products with best- and worst-practice 
performances of rival products in key areas in any promotion material. 
 
Policies to promote consumption X-efficiency by reducing search costs could include: 
 
· Provide websites at which customers can post their ratings/reviews of suppliers, 
and which offer summary scores (cf. eBay and Amazon.com), with audio versions 
available via phone numbers listed in the Yellow pages for the computer-shy.  
· Provide accreditation/monitoring of licensed brokers. 
· Require comparison-based advertisements. 
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Of course, from the market manipulation perspective, we should expect that firms would 
retaliate against policies aimed at reducing search costs by requiring information to be 
freely available. Waterson  (2003, p. 148) is concerned about this, too, and predicts that 
firms may increase differentiation (offering a bewildering product range as a counter to 
the commoditization of the product), increase product complexity (e.g. putting more fine 
print in contracts), and increase switching costs. Policies to reduce switching costs may 
incite similar retaliation. 
Policies may also be designed to reduce evaluation errors and promote pre-choice 
reflection, such as: 
 
· Require ‘cooling off’ periods before customers are allowed to sign final purchase 
contracts (as opposed to periods within which they can pull out of contracts). 
· Require that suppliers give ‘worked examples’ of costs of different plans that are 
being offered. 
· Require ‘bottom line’ prices, to include all ‘fees and charges’. 
· Provide precise (ideally brand-specific) risk information to preclude optimistic 
bias. 
· Engage in shocking counter-advertising against manipulative corporate 
advertisements, rather than restricting them (for example, about the risk of 
running into debt; cf. Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler, 2000). 
· Sponsor media coverage of work by behavioural economists, to generate 
awareness of the traps into which decision makers can unwittingly fall. 
 
 
7 WHOSE WELFARE IS IMPROVED BY A REDUCTION IN X-
INEFFICIENCY? 
 
The fact that Leibenstein’s X-inefficiency ideas have not previously been extended to the 
realm of consumer behaviour reflects a long-standing tendency of economists to keep 
production and consumption in separate mental boxes. As long ago as 1958, Cairncross 
questioned this tendency and a few years later, around the time that Leibenstein (1966) 
first proposed the X-inefficiency concept, there indeed began to emerge a literature that 
viewed households in terms of production theory (for example, Becker, 1965; Lancaster, 
1966a, Muth, 1966). The separation has persisted in welfare economics despite the 
problem that increases in productivity that result in falling prices and increased output do 
not necessarily imply increases in social wellbeing, for the extra output may have come at 
the cost of some workers having to work harder (Loasby, 1976b; Martin, 1978, p. 282) or 
under greater stress, or having to suffer dislocation costs as their employers downsized 
and forced them to find jobs elsewhere.  
The involvement of many consumers in production outside of their households 
poses similar complications when we view X-inefficiency from the consumer’s side of 
the market: if people become more canny shoppers, they will impose bigge r pressures on 
managers to find ways of reducing X-inefficiency in production, which may entail 
tougher work environments or dislocation costs.  For such downsides to be avoided, all 
organizations must be able to react to tightened competitive conditions in parallel by 
‘thinking smarter, not working harder’. If suppliers are not able to improve productivity, 
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then the only way they will be able to deal with more aggressive consumers and maintain 
their profit margins — aside from market manipulation ploys of the kind that concern 
Hanson and Kysar — is to engage in cross-subsidization by pushing up the prices they 
charge the more X-inefficient shoppers, such as those who do not bother to haggle with 
appliance retailers for discounts against marked prices.  
Potential for reductions in consumer X-inefficiency to have adverse overall 
consequences for welfare are evident in Tim Hazledine’s (1998, pp. 102-103) discussion 
of how market liberalization has affected New Zealand. He claims that prior to the 
liberalization process, it was uncommon for New Zealand’s consumers to try to bargain 
with retailers. Hazledine reports being bemused when his friends encouraged him to do 
so, and to get extra leverage by buying all his new appliances from a single store, when 
he returned after years overseas and needed to equip his house. Clearly, the cross-
subsidization issue might have major equity implications if the poor end up paying more 
because they have less buying clout and perhaps are less assertive and less skilled in 
bargaining. Hazledine also raises concerns about what the presence of aggressive 
bargaining does to the general efficiency of markets. For him, the world of bargaining 
looked like a retrograde step that made New Zealand’s newly liberalized consumer 
markets look more like bazaars in poor countries. Quite apart from the effort, time and 
stress involved in haggling, its spread meant that ‘list prices’ signal increasingly little 
about relative ‘real’ exchange values. If prices were non-negotiable, boundedly rational 
consumers would have a clearer idea about the value for money offered by rival products 
because they could focus on non-price aspects. Firms would have a bigger incentive to 
charge similar prices to their rivals and differentiate themselves genuinely in terms of 
non-price features rather than spuriously in terms of unreal ‘list prices’. We might also 
note that because of the cognitive limitations that consumers face, discounts for buying a 
bundle of goods probably also do not promote evaluations as careful as might be the case 
if each product were bought separately, especially if a trader ‘throws in’ an additional 
item for free to clinch a detail: as Hazledine (1998, p. 103) ruefully comments, ‘[B]y 
doing all my buying in one store in order to maximise my buying clout, I missed out on 
the range of products that were available if I had looked around. My “free” toaster, for 
example, works terribly — I’d have been better off paying proper money for a good 
toaster at a specialty store’. (Note here the possibility that even with his expertise in 
economics Hazledine has been caught as a consumer by something akin to a combination 
of sunk cost bias and the endowment effect: despite not having spent a particular amount 
of money on that ‘terrible ’ “free” toaster, he seems not to have disposed of it and gone 
out to buy a better replacement.) 
A final question to consider is what happens to wellbeing in societies where social 
competition increases and status-seeking consumers find themselves under greater 
pressure to obtain status symbols and display their skills in avoiding being fashion 
victims and in knowing where and how to get the best value for money. (As in, ‘What? 
You didn’t even try to find it on eBay?’) To those concerned with environmental issues, 
there is something unsavoury about the sight of consumers ‘spending money they haven’t 
earned to buy things they don’t want, to impress people they don’t like’ (these words are 
variously attributed to Ken Blanchard or Will Rogers at numerous Internet sites). On this 
view, people might feel better off if they learnt how to enjoy consuming less and worried 
less about their social status. An X-efficiency perspective offers a more positive slant. 
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Just as competitive pressure forces firms to try to innovate and develop ways of 
increasing their productivity, so market dynamics can also stimulating the development 
of consumer capabilities. Social competition may add stresses to life but it can also have 
beneficial consequences for personal development insofar as it puts pressure on 
consumers to experiment with new kinds of choices rather than letting their lives turn into 
a kind of ‘Groundhog Day’-style equilibrium in which they cease to develop as people. 
 
 
8 CASE STUDY (I): HOME RENOVATION PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 
 
As a more detailed example of the complexities of real world markets in which consumer 
X-inefficiency is likely to be significant, consider first the case of home renovation 
products and services. The context of choice here typically the following characteristics: 
 
· A chain of experience goods/services. 
· High stress/emotional involvement, that is not conducive to reflective decision-
making. 
· Misleading impressions of how easy the process may be for first-time renovators, 
given by ‘makeover’ TV programmes. 
· Access to multiple capabilities is required but skilled trades-people are in short 
supply. This leads to high costs of getting a range of estimates and pressures to 
accept conditions. 
· A house with an incomplete renovation project may be even less desirable than if 
would have been if the renovation had not been started (for example, once an 
existing bathroom has been ripped out, there is no going back, and no bathroom 
until the new one is finished). 
 
Consumers face choices between do- it-yourself and outsourcing of some or all of the 
activities, and can seek to reduce transaction costs by outsourcing to firms that offer 
package-deal project management services. 
Renovators may be aware of their own limited capabilities and hence prefer to 
avoid do-it-yourself, but have reason also to be nervous about the prospect of things 
going wrong if they get contractors in to do some or all of the work. From the standpoint 
of Williamson’s (1985) transaction cost analysis of internalisation and outsourcing 
choices, decision makers will be nervous about doing deals with contractors in situations 
of (a) complexity/bounded rationality, (b) opportunism, (c) small numbers of potential 
suppliers or customers, and (d) asset specificity. Although he suggests market contracts 
should work unless all four of these features are present, in the context of housing 
renovations the first three may be sufficient to cause problems. First, note that here 
complexity is likely to lead to contractual incompleteness due to: difficulty in articulating 
what is required/to be delivered; failure to foresee possible eventualities (such as the 
discovery of rotting timbers); and ambiguity about what has been delivered relative to 
what was specified. These are likely to result in opposing interpretations of ‘state of the 
world’ while work is being done. Scope for disputes might be reduced via the use of 
standard contracts, delegation to professional project managers (but can they be trusted?), 
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and if the authorities have building inspection requirements at various points in the 
course of a project. 
Contractual incompleteness presents opportunities for contractors to engage in the 
guileful pursuit of self- interest. They will be in a powerful position to threaten to delay 
completion in order to extort better terms, because of the great dislocation costs imposed 
by many such projects. They may need to impose delays because they have deliberately 
over-committed in case some contracts are cancelled, and they are in a good position to 
exploit their customers’ lack of expertise and inability to monitor them full-time. 
Regulations requiring building inspections and warranties may safeguard consumers 
against under-servicing and tardy completion. However, it may come at the cost of 
increasing project lengths if projects cannot proceed to their next stage until an inspector 
has signed off work that will be covered up by work that follows.   
At first sight, the great number of potential suppliers of renovation services in the 
Yellow Pages of a major city may appear to imply there is no ‘small numbers’ problem. 
Moreover, suppliers can seek to signal quality via their membership of trade associations 
and testimonials from previous customers, whilst renovators can also use their social 
networks to try to find reliable contractors. Things get difficult, however, when there are 
shortages of skilled trades-people relative to the total demand for their services, as this 
limits the ability of house owners to find replacement contractors at short-notice if they 
want to fire existing ones mid-task. Once hired, a contractor can therefore strategically 
weigh up the benefits of acting with opportunism versus the damage this might do to his 
or her reputation: chances of being fired are rather slim and having some disgruntled 
customers who pass negative comments to their social networks may not prevent fur ther 
business from being picked up in the sellers’ market if at other times the job is done well 
and an up-to-date stock of testimonials is maintained. 
Asset specificity is an issue that normally puts much of the risk of a transaction on 
to the supplier’s side. Its significance is limited in the renovation context as far as 
investments in tools by contractors are concerned. Payment by instalments as work 
proceeds largely eliminates the potential risk associated with the immobility of the work 
that has been done. However, instalment payments limit customer leverage over 
contractors who fail to finish their tasks because more lucrative contracts have become 
available elsewhere. 
Aside from the general problem renovators have doing trouble-free deals with 
contractors at prices that do not entail excessive profit margins, the context of renovation 
makes it ripe for renovators to over-capitalize, i.e. to end up spending far more on 
projects than the value the completed work will add to their properties. In terms of 
behavioural economics, such projects seem to have enormous potential for escalation of 
commitment and spending blowouts rather similar to those observed with public works 
projects. One aspect of this is where the decision to go ahead with the project is based on 
a rough estimate of its overall costs but where it actually consists of a series of sub-
projects, the costs of which are only worked out with some care when their time for 
implementation arrives. Another issue is that renovation projects often impose major 
disruptions to life in already-occupied properties. If problems are encountered, renovators 
may tend to want completion ‘at all costs’ just to get their lives back to normal as soon as 
possible. (This tendency will be increased to the extent that decision makers engage in 
hyperbolic discounting rather than exponential discounting.) Not only may renovators put 
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pressure on them to agree to ‘necessary’ work that initially had not been specified (which 
perhaps the contractor had been ‘holding up his or her sleeve’ at the time of doing the 
estimate) but there may also be scope for the contractor to push the case for less 
‘essential’ additional work on the basis of the costs of delaying it to another time. Under 
pressure for a quick decision to avoid delays and disruptions, the quality of choice is 
unlikely to be good, since: 
 
· Increments to cost appear smaller due to framing effects in terms of money so far 
spent. 
· There will be a ‘sunk cost bias’ against trying to achieve a ‘cut and shut’ end to 
project where costs start to escalate. 
· Cognitive dissonance reduction processes are likely to result in the renovator 
padding estimates of payoffs (or emphasize more distant returns) in line with cost 
escalations. 
· Shopping around for alternative quotations for the additional work may greatly 
lengthen the time to completion and cause chaos with contractors’ work schedules 
for other projects, so the pressure to accept and hope one is not being ‘ripped off’ 
is acute. The trouble is, trades-persons may recognize this and be prone to 
succumb to the conflict of interest they face if they both recommend what needs 
to be done and get paid for doing it.  
 
On top of tendencies to be willing to let costs escalate, there is the increasingly common 
ability to do so without having to ask hard financial questions in cases where renovators 
are drawing against substantial unused credit lines on home-equity mortgages. 
To reduce these risks of over-capitalization, the authorities might develop 
websites and/or pamphlets warning consumers of why they might end up spending far too 
much. They might also publish guidelines for what it is wise to spend on particular kinds 
of renovations in particular property price ranges — though, in doing so, they run the risk 
that these will become quotation norms. A more radical policy would be to make 
renovation contractors liable for all ‘unforeseen’ work that is needed to complete project, 
as an incentive toward due diligence when preparing estimates and to refrain from 
keeping quiet about additional work they suspected might be necessary. 
 
 
9 CASE STUDY (2): FINANCIAL SERVICES 
 
We have already seen, via the work of Waterson (2003), discussed in section 6, that 
profitability in the banking sector may be affected by the reluctance of consumers to 
switch between rival banks, in sharp contrast to their willingness to switch between 
different providers of motor vehicle insurance. In this section I probe a bit further into the 
financial services sector to show areas other than in respect of switching costs where a 






A behavioural perspective on speculative choices in asset markets of the kind that 
occurred in New Zealand in the boom-bust episode around 1985-8 implies a need both to 
protect consumers from themselves and from financial intermediaries. We should not be 
surprised that so many novice speculators got sucked into speculation, often at great cost 
to their personal wealth. When markets are rising rapidly, the behavioural economist 
would expect a mood of euphoria to set in (Minsky, 1975) with decisions about asset 
commitments being taken in haste and with insufficient diligence, and for processes of 
cognitive dissonance reduction to result in a blind eye being turned to the possibility of a 
market reversal (Kaish, 1986). (The cognitive dissonance issue also arises regarding how 
individuals and financial institutions deal with losses during a down-turn. Unlike realized 
losses which have a rather concrete reality, paper losses can be dismissed, if one wishes, 
on the basis that values are bound to recover sooner or later.)  
The need to protect consumers against risks associated with speculation in 
financial assets and property investments seems strong not merely because of the 
likelihood of poor-quality decision-making but also because of the encouragement to 
engage in such risk-taking that comes from the financial institutions themselves. So long 
as banks allow for possible falls in asset values when their customers borrow against their 
existing assets for speculative purposes, the risk is almost entirely on the side of the 
borrower. For example, suppose you own a house worth $400,000, with a mortgage of 
$100,000. If the bank will extend your mortgage to $150,000, you can use the extra 
$50,000 as a deposit on an investment apartment purchased for $250,000, against which 
the bank is happy to lend you a further $200,000. In effect, you have a 100 per cent 
mortgage on the investment property. If this were the only property that you owned, this  
would be risky to the bank, since if you defaulted on payments and the property market 
had not risen, then a forced sale of the property would probably yield less than the 
amount owed on it. This is not so where one loan is leveraged against the equity in 
another asset. If property prices fell by, say, 30 per cent your two properties would be 
worth $455,000, not $650,000, but this still provides the bank with comfortable 
headroom over the $350,000 that you owe, so there is minimal risk of loss to the bank if 
you were to default and the properties were to be sold at short notice.  
Given this, there may be a case for requiring that anyone who undertakes such 
ventures should be provided with information about the past performance of the assets in 
question over the long period (so that they do not operate with simplistic and incorrect 
decision rules that, on the basis of ‘as safe as houses’ principle, deny the risk of price 
falls) both in terms of capital values and income streams. Furthermore, at the time of 
signing the loan documents, they could be required to make a declaration that they were 
supplied with this information at least 48 hours previously and have read and reflected 
upon it. This seems especially important with inexperienced investors who are a long way 
along a decision rule cascade (Earl, Peng and Potts, 2005) and hence are likely to be 
latecomers to the market, less adept at spotting properties with the best potential for 






Behavioural economics leads to other concerns about consumer debt, which might be 
addressed via regulatory policy: 
 
1. Although it is quite easy to calculate total interest charges on a loan and see 
whether, in the light of them, one really wants that desperately to own right now 
the item in question, there is no guarantee that consumers will do so and 
concentrate their minds in this way. Loans are typically framed in ways that are 
designed to show whether they are affordable, such as monthly or weekly 
repayments, with interest charges often kept well out of sight in the ‘fine print’ 
and total charges not mentioned at all.  
2. With car financing, the borrower’s risk is often increased by offers such as ‘$3000 
minimum trade- in, regardless of condition’. Because of the probability of some 
customers indeed trading vehicles that are virtually worthless, car yards that offer 
such deals have to advertise higher prices than rivals that are not making such 
trade- in offers. However, these deals enable someone with a worthless old car and 
no cash for a deposit to be eligible for what is in effect 100 per cent loan despite 
the asset being one whose market value is likely initially to fall faster than the 
amount owed against it. For example, although the customer might be denied a 
100 per cent loan against a $10,000 car from another yard after taking his or her 
present car to the wreckers, they may be granted $10,000 finance against a similar 
vehicle that is supposedly sold for $13,000 with a $3000 trade- in allowance. 
According to the paperwork, this is only a 77 per cent loan. If the borrower is 
taking an over-optimistic view of the prospect of being able to keep up 
repayments and the lender is also suffering from bounded rationality about the  
genuine worth of what is being purchased, then we have a recipe for defaults that 
could have serious consequences. 
3. If consumers have a poor understanding of the distribution of risks between 
themselves and suppliers of finance when they enter into a loan, they need a way 
for judging whether a particular loan will be safe to take up. If they take the view 
that a default by themselves is not in the interests of the loan provider, they may 
see the latter as a source of supply of decision rules about what constitutes safe 
borrowing, even though the financial institution’s lending rule, unbeknown to 
them, is one that would be safe for the institution even if the customer defaulted. 
Even so, this may result in them facing the prospect of loan repayments that look 
pretty scary. If consumers face cognitive dissonance between, say, thinking of 
themselves as the sort of person who can own a particular asset and thinking 
about the financial stress that a loan to purchase it might entail, they can resolve 
the cognitive dissonance by giving a positive spin to ambiguity about, say, their 
immediate promotion prospects, repair bills and so on, rather than seeing such 
uncertainties as grounds for caution and for holding back from extending 
themselves to the limit in financial terms. 
4. Compared with traditional fixed-term loans and hire purchase agreements, credit 
cards and home equity loans/credit- line mortgages are much more likely to result 
in problematic decisions due to the ways that consumers wrestle with their lack of 
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self control and manage cognitive dissonance. In the case of credit cards, those 
who do not see themselves as the sort of person who gets into debt can succumb 
to the temptation to purchase something with a credit card on the basis that they 
are using it as a means of payment. At the time of making the purchase, they can 
tell themselves that they will not use the extended credit facility but later on they 
may concoct a way to justify to themselves not paying it off in full (Maital, 1982). 
With lines of credit, there is nothing to concentrate the borrower’s mind on the 
implications of buying something now in terms of the extra monthly interest cost 
and what it might be necessary to do by way of increasing monthly repayments to 
pay off the balance within a particular period. This open-ended and vague 
arrangement is highly conducive to decision making in which short-term desires 
hold sway, any long-term implications depending on how one chooses to frame 
them. Matters would be rather different if, before making any major drawing on 
their credit lines, consumers were required to complete a form that spelt out the 
implications of the extra borrowing in terms of monthly interest charges and 
amount extra it would cost per month to bring the outstanding balance back to 
where it was within, say, three years. 
5. Risks of poor credit appraisals increase if intermediaries compete increasingly via 
rule-based (e.g. on- line) application systems rather than face-to-face interviews 
that permit the nuances of body language and nervous expressions to be picked 
up. If financial intermediaries had tighter profit margins, incentives to reduce 
default risks (rather than pad them into interest charges) would be higher. 
 
With many kinds problem debt, the consumers in question often are not those who 
are poor in absolute terms. Those who are really poor are unlikely to have the assets or 
income flows to be eligible for, say, a credit- line mortgage. Rather, problem debtors may 
be people whose incomes do not match those of their reference group, whose lifestyles 
they seek to emulate by their spending (see the literature reviewed by Lea, 1999). In such 
cases, the best policies might be not those of the kind suggested by Jolls, Sunstein and 
Thaler (2000), based on shocking counter-advertising about risks of running into debt, 
but policies that somehow seek to change the reference groups that people use.  
Obviously, some leverage might be achieved by policies aimed at exploding the 
mythology of ‘designer brands’, limiting the pressure to pay premium prices by 
publicizing the functional differences and value for money offered by rival products. 
Government policies may not always be necessary to do this, for market institutions such 
as consumer magazines may do the job perfectly well. In the case of the Audi A3 versus 
Skoda Octavia example used earlier in this paper, my discussion was originally pieced 
together from regular reading of the motoring press, but now, in its December 2005 issue, 
the respected UK monthly Car Magazine at last has provided a myth-busting comparison 
test of the Audi and Skoda, along with their Volkswagen Golf and SEAT Leon stable-
mates. The question remaining, though, is whether such myth-busting messages reach the 
wider population so that those who show off their wealth by buying prestigious brands at 
the same time show how bad they are at shopping for value. A particular problem area is 
when the status-related consumption that drives people into debt involves purchases for 
children: one suspects that those who, say, have trouble paying their normal household 
bills after equipping their children with up-market trainers, iPODs, etc. did not do provide 
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the money to purchase these items on the basis of a careful search regarding their 
functional properties relative to alternatives, and nor were assiduous readers of consumer 
magazines. 
An alternative approach to policy in this area is to do some lateral thinking and 
consider the bigger picture of how different policy objectives inter-relate. For example, 
the need to regulate behaviour in the market for consumer credit might be much reduced 
if a government is successfully promoting policies to harm for the environment, so that 
consumers increasingly aspire to match those who are conspicuously frugal. (Care may 
be required here: there is a world of difference between being frugal by only driving a 
sub-2-litre car instead of a V8, and being frugal by borrowing an extra $10,000 to buy a 
highly distinctive Toyota Prius hybrid petrol/electric car whose singularity means it also 
functions rather well as a status symbol.)  
Likewise, consumer debt problems might be reduced if people could be 
encouraged to see early retirement as a sign of high status, and hence to take a longer-
term view of the implications of their current consumption for delaying retirement. One 
way to do this would be to require consumers to be shown the financial implications of 
extra debt in terms of their retirement age at present rates of asset accumulation, or what 
their future rate of saving will now have to be to maintain the target retirement age. Such 
measures, like the ones suggested earlier in relation to credit- line usage, are technically 
easy to put in place nowadays via interactive websites integrated with existing electronic 
banking, in which barriers to increased indebtedness are only lifted if one has actually 
gone though the calculations on-screen and had one’s mind suitably concentrated on the 
long-run financial implications of the purchase one is thinking of doing.  
Finally, note that just as the management of cognitive dissonance can result in 
people getting over-indebted, so it may also result in any debt crises turning out to be 
more problematic than it needs to be: one way to maintain the position that one does not 
have a debt problem is not to open any letters from the bank or finance company. 
 
 
Superannuation and Investment 
 
Policy makers in this area of investment regulation have tended to focus mainly on the 
conflicts of interest faced by investment advisers and their lack of accountability. From 
the behavioural standpoint, we need to be more concerned with three other issues. The 
first is that, as with tendencies of people to fail to consult lawyers or doctors until 
problems have arisen rather than on a precautionary basis, people may be reluctant to pay 
purely for advice from independent financial experts: if the advice confirms their 
expectations, then they have ‘wasted their money’, while if it does not, it may be advice 
they are uncomfortable about hearing (for example, about just how long it could take 
them to build up an adequate retirement fund).  
Secondly, there is the extreme complexity of superannuation products and, in 
some countries, their tax implications. The fee structures for entry, ongoing management 
and exit can have major implications for ultimate payouts on retirement, and mistakes are 
easy to make. However, that complexity by no means precludes the possibility of policies 
designed to show consumers the likely implications of choosing one product rather than 
another or switching between funds. This can be done via interactive websites, despite 
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current lack of an industry offering this service. Such services could also include worked 
examples by way of trying to ensure users did not fail to explore certain kinds of 
scenario, and could show returns to ‘tangible property’ of various kinds (cars, houses) 
under various ownership strategies to concentrate investors’ minds on opportunity costs. 
(Similar interactive comparison websites could be provided for banks’ loan products if 
we were nervous about the independence of mortgage-broking firms that claim to be able 
to find the most cost-effective mortgage to match any homebuyer’s particular 
circumstances.) 
Thirdly, there is the issue of the extent of financial literacy that people bring to 
their investment choices. In the midst of all the concern about principal-agent problems 
involved with the use of non-independent financial advisers, and hence the need for 
policies about disclosure of interest, a basic point is being missed: if we take the ‘efficient 
markets’ hypothesis seriously, then people should not even be seeking advice about how 
to get a good return from investment in shares, or asking about league tables of past 
performance of superannuation funds as indicators of likely future performance. 
Although the ‘behavoiural finance literature is looking at the relevance of decision 
heuristics and biases for the performance of financial markets, so far the message is that 
‘bulletproof evidence that the market is not rational in the mainstream finance, beat-the-
market sense is yet to be provided’ (Stracca, 2004, p. 399; see also Sar, 2004). What they 
should do, therefore, is simply accept that they cannot beat the market’s average 
performance in the long run and invest in market- index funds. The advice that is relevant 
to them is about risk and return issues associated with the balance of their portfolios 
between shares and other assets, given their age and intended time of retirement. 
Initiatives to increase financial literacy are likely to be of limited cost-
effectiveness if they involve general mail-outs to households. Rather they need to target 
those approaching significant financial choices and/or where benefits of changing one’s 
bank of investment strategy could be significant relative to switching costs (e.g., when 
changing jobs, looking for new home or car). Policymakers may consider informative 
advertising about financial issues in real estate, motoring and personal finance sections of 
newspapers. Any such advertising needs to be constructed mindful not only of the need to 
avoid information overload but also of the need to engage people’s attention rather than 
going too far with fear appeals and hence causing them to turn a blind eye to significant 





By taking a behavioural perspective on consumer choice and using it to extend 
Leibenstein’s X-inefficiency concept we can rethink the economics of market regulation. 
When Leibenstein introduced the concept of X-efficiency he only addressed implications 
of this in terms of choices within organizations. He sought to show that calculations of 
welfare losses due to imperfectly competitive markets might be prone to under-estimation 
because, relative to given demand curves, costs might be higher than they needed to be 
due to X-inefficiency arising as a result of limited competitive pressure. What he failed to 
address was the possibility that positions of demand curves could be wrong, too, with 
consumers being more willing to pay for some products than they needed to be, because 
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of shortcomings in the ways that they sought to cope with the problem of choice. If 
consumers develop better ways of capturing consumer surplus, they put firms under 
greater pressure to innovate and find ways of reducing X-inefficiency in their existing 
activities. Regulatory policies aimed at increasing consumers’ purchasing capabilities 
may thus have an important role to play in promoting industrial dynamism. However, 
they need to be carefully designed to ensure that firms cannot retaliate by stepping up 
their attempts to capture consumer surplus via market manipulation ploys aimed at 
moving their demand curves back towards the right. Behavioural economics has much to 
offer in attempts to understand sources of consumption X-inefficiency, how market 
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